25 November 2024
The Ruben Amorim era kicked off with a tactical display that showcased both promising evolution and concerning vulnerabilities. Manchester United's new buildup patterns clashed with Ipswich's intelligent exploitation of space.
Let's take a closer look at Amorim's tactics, starting with United in possession.
What impressed the most about United's buildup was how quickly we could see Amorim implementing the strong tactical identity he had at Sporting. Establishing a clear tactical identity was something Ten Hag had struggled with, and Amorim’s approach started right from the buildup phase. When Onana had the ball, the team's shape was fascinating. Amorim clearly prefers to have three defenders in the buildup phase, allowing easy switches from side to side and coverage across the pitch. Whenever Onana was in possession, United essentially had four players in the deeper zone. Initially, it seemed unusual to have the oldest center-back playing as one of the wider defenders, as the convention is to place them in the middle for protection, as seen with Thiago Silva at Chelsea. However, this choice made sense quickly, as De Ligt—United’s best ball-playing defender—was tasked with moving into the midfield region during active play.
This movement complemented the midfield setup, triggering Eriksen to push higher up. This adjustment transformed a two-man midfield into a trio, making United much harder to press. Ipswich, often deploying a midfield duo, struggled against this setup. Eriksen's positioning allowed him to exploit space either on the left-hand side or on the right, depending on whether Fernandes was positioned higher up or dropped deeper.
Despite the promising tactical adjustments, vulnerabilities became apparent. Early on, United's central center-back often moved too far forward, leaving a massive gap in the defense. Ipswich adapted to this by resisting the temptation to push their center-backs too high, instead focusing on using their wider forwards to sit deeper. This made it harder for United to access their double pivot, forcing Ipswich's deeper midfielders to track players dropping between the lines.
Higher up the pitch, Ipswich aimed to maintain an aggressive press. Their wingers tried to keep United's pivots in their cover shadows while still pressing. However, Ipswich's press was not fully coordinated, leaving gaps for United to exploit. When a United pivot found space, Ipswich’s midfield had to abandon their men higher up, allowing United to play through the lines.
As the game progressed, Ipswich adapted further. They often shifted into a back five, with Burns dropping deep on the right-hand side.
United’s attacking play, particularly their wide exploration, looked highly promising. From early on, it was clear the left-hand side would be their primary avenue for creating chances. A combination of Dalot and Garnacho higher up the pitch proved effective. United maintained a back three during the buildup, with De Ligt in a more traditional role, freeing Dalot to advance down the left. This forced Burns to stay deep, often resulting in a man-oriented defensive approach from Ipswich.
Dalot adapted well, sometimes receiving the ball deep to draw Burns out, creating opportunities for one-on-one situations. On occasion, Dalot managed to bypass Burns,. However, United primarily focused on isolating Garnacho higher up the pitch. They frequently launched long balls, leveraging Garnacho’s pace and bravery to exploit the center-back matchup. His ability to beat defenders and create danger played out to United’s advantage, particularly in the first half.
Overall, the match demonstrated Amorim's strong tactical imprint but also highlighted areas for defensive improvement. Ipswich’s adaptability and United's vulnerabilities provided a compelling tactical battle.
